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Abstract
Social identity is increasingly accepted as a key concept underpin-
ning the endogeneity of economic behaviour and preferences. This
feature is especially important in explaining redistribution preferences
as well as attitudes towards redistribution and pro-social behaviour.
This paper carries out a review of the literature on the question and ex-
amines how economic theory conceptualises and empirically measures
social identity and its eﬀects on preferences towards redistribution, so-
cial solidarity and redistributive institutions. Findings indicate that
social identity does carries a weight in explaining the presence of social
preferences and attitudes towards redistributive institutions.
Keywords: social identity, preferences for redistribution, inequal-
ity, diversity, redistributive institutions. JEL: H1, I3.
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1 Introduction
The standard consumer sovereignty principle assumes that people make deci-
sions based upon their own utilities that in turn represent their independent,
exogenous preferences. Traditional models incorporate imperfections in indi-
vidual behaviour resulting from lack of information and network externalities
ensuing from other people's actions. More recently economists have reconsid-
ered the assumption of preference interdependence, which implies that social
and cultural environment with which the agent interacts at diﬀerent points
in time and space aﬀects individual behaviour by aﬀecting preferences and
attitudes. This gives rise to the revisiting of a central issue in the economics
discipline (Veblen 1899).
Social identity has been deﬁned in social psychology as that part of an
individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership
in a social group (Tajfel 1978), hence identity relies on a shared psycholog-
ical or physical category. The extent to which identity inﬂuence preferences
has wide-ranging implications for welfare economics, and calls into question
the independence of welfare analysis that builds upon exogeneous individ-
ual preferences (Zizzo 2003). Social identity might be consistent with evi-
dence suggesting that higher diversity can reduce altruism and redistribution
(Luttmer 2001). Luttmer (2001) ﬁnds a suggestive negative relationship be-
tween diversity and preferences for redistribution.
Redistribution is one of the central features of welfare states. However,
maintenance of redistributive institutions largely depends on individual sup-
port for taxing higher incomes more heavily and targeting expenditures to
social need. Our focus in this paper is on individuals' willingness to redis-
tribute. Diﬀerent forms of redistribution and altruism are constrained by
individual attitudes through some form of aggregation rule, hence changes in
the willingness of individuals to pay taxes, to transfer resources to the needi-
est and support for redistribution-enhancing institutions might result in sig-
niﬁcant changes in social redistribution. The extent of subjective willingness
to accept redistributive transfers and its relation to actual redistribution is
something that calls for empirical investigation: it is important to establish a
model that appropriately represents what appears to go on in the real world
and to identify the key variables in the supposed relationship. If subjective
preferences for redistribution determine tolerance of redistribution in prac-
tice, then the underlying mechanisms of such attitudes should be examined
and integrated into economic models. Suggestive evidence shows that indi-
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viduals' preferences for redistribution are interdependent in the sense that is
inﬂuence by the characteristics of other individuals around them (Luttmer
2001). So individuals appear to be more likely to redistribute to the groups
they identify with, be that identiﬁcation based on ethnicity, religious group,
social class, region etc. The importance of shared identities lies in that when
individuals fail to match with one identity they can develop oppositional
identities (Battu and Zenou 2010), which is found to lead to labour market
segregation and isolation.
Not only attitudes matter. Guiso et al (2006) argue that behaviour is the
result of individual's attitudes and their social environment, a primary source
of interdependence. Yet individual internalization of each social environment
results in social identity. Social identity can hypothetically determine the ex-
tent of individual altruism towards the members of a group rather than those
that fall outside the group limits. Sochanges in the deﬁnition and categorisa-
tion of what the group includes might have a non negligible inﬂuence on an
individual's altruistic behaviour or redistribution attitudes. Groups develop
common shared meanings (cultures as deﬁned by Guiso et al. 2006), prior
common values and social norms, and some of these dimensions are path
dependent, rather than being chosen by individuals themselves, and under
certain conditions can be regarded as exogenous.
The inclusion of social identity in decision making models, however it is
conceived, challenges the assumption of preference independence by drawing
upon some forms of collective deﬁnition of the self, and call for a revisit of
the formation of both individual and social welfare functions. Social identity
is environmentally learned through diﬀerent mechanisms including vertical
and horizontal transmission, and instrumentally determined by objectively
identiﬁable psychosocial traits (e.g., language, social class and gender). So-
cial identity is constructed and reinforced through several forms of social
interaction containing information on social norms, values and preferences
shared among a certain group. The group in turn shapes individuals' prefer-
ences by deﬁning a sense of belonging, namely, a collective deﬁnition of the
self that parallels, and to some extent complements that of the individual
one. To capture these externalities Akerlof (1997) presents two behavioural
models: people either try to increase social distance (status seeking) or align
themselves more closely (conformist behaviour) with certain social categories.
Social norms are assumed inﬂuence behaviour because they aﬀect the individ-
ual's preferences. An individual suﬀers disutility from deviating from his or
her category norms, which causes behaviour to conform toward those norms
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(Costa-i-Font and Jofre-Bonet 2012).
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) conceptualise identity formally by consider-
ing a set of social categories and associated prescriptions, so that identity en-
compasses both utility and disutility by conforming actions to prescriptions.
Identity is envisaged as a sense of self or self-image nested on social categories,
so individuals' social environment encompasses a set of prescriptive norms.
Luttmer (2001) provides empirical evidence showing that individual prefer-
ences for redistribution depend on the characteristics of individuals around
them. He shows evidence of a negative exposure eﬀect whereby individuals
decrease their support for welfare as the welfare recipiency in their commu-
nity rises. Similarly, they show evidence of a racial group eﬀect that reveals
that individuals increase their support for welfare spending as the share of
the recipients from their own racial group increase. Bisin et al. (2008) and
Battu et al. (2007) construct a model of ethnic identity formation focusing
on how choice of identity is aﬀected by cultural transmission. In their model,
social interactions that lead to identity formation is a form of externality
that explain why employment rates of white population is associated with
that of non-whites. Klor and Shayo (2010) using experimental data ﬁnd that
individuals' preferences over redistribution are aﬀected by the payoﬀs of her
in-group members. Shayo (2009 and 2010) deﬁnes identity as resulting from
individuals' status. Thus identiﬁcation comes from two processes, a ﬁrst one
where individuals care about the status of the group (relative status) oand,
a second one deﬁned by an individual willingness to resemble other group
individuals (distance of proximity). The former could be categorized as a
speciﬁc form of esteem dependent behaviour.
So identity gives rise to individual actions to protect the social self
which include reciprocity and welfare-maximising actions and give rise to
social preferences. The major examples of the inﬂuence of identity include
the inﬂuence of social identity in the form of religion on the contribution
to public goods and worker reciprocity (Benjamin et al. 2010). The latter
lies in using environmental cues called primes that can temporarily make
a certain social category more salient, causing a person's behaviour to tilt
more toward the norms associated with the salient category. Furthermore,
other studies suggest territorial identity as inﬂuencing tipping behaviour, for
example blood and organ donation as well as participation is electoral pro-
cesses, despite the net beneﬁt of such behaviour is almost negligible. Using
status as a clearing variable Shayo (2009) suggests that two equilibria may
emerge. Firstly, the members of the lower class (who constitute a majority)
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identify with their class. As a consequence they vote for a relatively high
level of redistribution. This can in turn help strengthen class identity by en-
dowing it with a higher status. In the second type of equilibrium, members
of the lower class tend to think of themselves more as members of the na-
tion as a whole than as members of a low-status part of it. The equilibrium
also depends on proximity. A common national thread and extensive het-
erogeneity among the working class weaken working-class solidarity. Besides
redistribution itself, social identity might exert an inﬂuence on redistribu-
tive institutions. The latter refers primarily to the welfare state, support
for welfare services and social insurance schemes. But institutions undertake
both redistribution (anonymous redistribution) and insurance (collective risk
sharing). Both functions of the welfare state are arguably sensitive to the
weakening of social identity. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that solidarity
within the welfare state will be weakened as a result of increasing social het-
erogeneity. They demonstrate that there is a negative correlation between
racial fractionalization and the level of social spending. This view has been
challenged by the fact that resilience of immigrants on welfare provided ser-
vices explain why they are perceived as groups that largely receives social
beneﬁts (Boeri et al. 2002). However, (Dahlberg et al. 2012) ﬁnds casual
evidence of increased immigration on the support for redistribution using
exogenous variation form policy migration reform in Sweden.
This paper examines whether individual's attitudes towards the other
members of society, the institutions that guarantee redistribution and the
underlying preferences towards a world of more redistribution are driven by
social identity. By doing so we attempt to clarify a set of questions, namely:
 What do economists understand by social identity, and how does it
diﬀers from other similar concepts such as group, social motivations,
group externalities and peer eﬀects?
 How does the economics literature conceptualise preferences and at-
titudes towards fairness, particularly about redistributive institutions
and policies?
 Is there evidence of a potential relationship between social identity,
attitudes and preferences for redistribution and the welfare state atti-
tudes?
Empirical evidence is available from both from econometric and experimental
studies; the latter has the obvious advantage that controls for unobserved
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eﬀects can be monitored more easily. This paper attempts to classify existing
evidence according to several criteria and summarises the state of the art
along with pinpointing ways forward. The organisation of the paper is as
follows. The next section discusses the meaning of social identity and its
inception in economic theory. Section three discusses existing evidence on
the determinants and preferences for redistribution and discusses how social
identity might be consistent with stylised facts. Section four assesses the
available evidence on the eﬀects of social identity on redistribution or pro-
social attitudes examining diﬀerent relevant social dimensions. Section ﬁve
provides a discussion of existing ﬁndings along with an evaluation of the ways
forward, and section six concludes.
2 Identity and its meanings
2.1 Approaches to identity
Society can be divided into social groups based on diﬀerent categorisations,
such as class, ethnicity, language and so on. People identify with such el-
ements in some of these categorisations and actions are assumed to follow
from such identiﬁcation. To account for this feature, the psychological theory
of social identity developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) can be applied to in-
tergroup discrimination. Indeed, discrimination depends on how individuals
categorise each other, identify in social categories and compare each other
in a way that we favourably bias our actions and perceptions towards the
group we identify with. Belonging to a group provides the individuals with
self esteem and to conform to the social norms and distinguish itself as a
separate entity or as part of a group (Abrams and Hogg 1990). However, the
social categories into which people place themselves are parts of a structured
society and exist only in relation to other contrasting categories; the value
of each group identity derives from a comparison of those within the group
with with the traits of those in some other reference group. Identity-driven
behaviour is such that those traits that favour the in-group are usually em-
phasised group distinction will be minimised (Stets and Burke 2000), group
outcomes of other group are perceived as the individual's own. People tend
to associate themselves with highly successful groups though group member-
ship, such as ethnic group or gender are not always chosen . Furthermore, not
all members are equal, whilst weak members of a group will gain through the
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mere identiﬁcation with the group relatively strong members of the group,
in contrast, strive to improve their identity through promotion to a higher
group if possible rather than collective in-group eﬀort (Ellemers et al. 1990).
The process of identiﬁcation with a group is endogenously determined, con-
structed in some degree, by changes in relevant social parameters in such way
that group formation is inherently variable, ﬂuid, and context dependent.
McAdams (1995) even argues that groups use intra-group status rewards as
a non-material means of gaining material sacriﬁce from members. Thus, in-
dividuals value the opinions of the groups to which they belong and seek
to be acknowledged as members in good standing. However, in the case of
interaction with other groups, McAdams (1995) argues that discrimination
is a means by which social groups produce status for their members.
Diﬀerent literature streams are summarised below, and suggest an array
of questions that recognise the importance of the social environment. These
approaches reﬂect diﬀerent attempts of economic theory to deal with the
preference endogeneity assumption, either by assuming some form of meta-
preference (e.g., identity, social norms) constraining individual's utilities and
behaviour or diﬀerent types of information externalities or social interactions.
2.2 Identity and Economics
How identity forms and manifests itself is a dynamic process linked to so-
cial interactions. Norms, values and rules, which bind members of a social
group, are inherent in the formation of social identities. Sen (1977) in his
avant-garde piece about the rational egoistic man of Edgeworth talked about
psychological issues that underlie choice and relate to consumer decisions and
production activities. He introduced the concepts of sympathy and commit-
ment as part of the utility maximizing function, arguing that commitment
as part of behaviour can result in non-gains-maximizing answers, even when
answers are truthful. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) oﬀer a novel theoretical
framework of the utility maximization function by incorporating an individ-
ual's self-identiﬁcation as powerful motivation for behaviour. They imply
that if individuals achieve their ideal self and are comfortable with their
identity then their utility increases, otherwise, their utility decreases. In
this framework, it is then possible that even rational individuals chose non-
optimal occupations because of identity considerations.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) introduced a redeﬁnition of the Tajfel and
Turner (1979) concept of identity in a standard neoclassic framework mean-
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ing a person's self-image and sense of self insofar as it ﬁts into a set of social
categories that imply expected behaviours valued in an economic utility func-
tion. So social identity results from membership in some social group both
chosen and given (e.g., gender, ethnic group), which induces prescriptions
cause utility or disutility. They argue that individuals earn additional utility
from an identity that matches their ideals. Norms and prescriptions arise
endogenously from social interaction and overall outcomes are likely to diﬀer
from what is predicted by models based on methodological individualism be-
cause norms of appropriate and inappropriate behaviour diﬀer across space
and time. The individual suﬀers a loss in utility that depends on the distance
of his or her behaviour from that of the self-chosen ideal. The Akerlof and
Kranton (2000) concept of identity is a further development of the Akerlof
(1997) contribution on social distance and social decisions. This work ex-
tends previous work by Becker (1991) and Becker and Murphy (1993) and
has been applied to gender behaviour (Akerlof and Kranton 2000), education
(Akerlof and Kranton 2002) and contract theory (Akerlof and Kranton 2005).
In Akerlof and Kranton (2005) they focus on intra-group eﬀects on cooper-
ative behaviour. So, if an agent internalises an organisation's objective and
norms, it might suﬃce as a form of motivation to sustain high eﬀort. Insid-
ers will exert more eﬀort than outsiders becuase they gain identity payoﬀs,
and accordingly corporate eﬀorts to build organisational identity might ex-
ert returns. Bénabou and Tirole (2007) develop a complementary framework
based on the individual management of beliefs and identity investment in
social groups. Parents may purposely transmit distorted views about the
reality of inequality and social mobility to their children in order to inﬂuence
their incentives (Bénabou and Tirole 2006).
Wichardt (2008) argues that identity is multidimensional and it might be
that tradeoﬀs arise in individuals' categorisations of identity, so that diﬀerent
traits deﬁning individual's identity might not be perfectly aligned and become
exclusive. The positive identity the individual then gains through the group
is based on the general tendency to perceive all group members as equal
and to attribute group success to oneself . Increased in-group homogeneity,
acceptance and a small group size which facilitate this perception or increase
the individual's share of the group's success, therefore, further increase the
individual's identiﬁcation or social aﬃliation with the respective group. In
essence, each individual will focus especially on those groups which oﬀer
the most favourable comparisons in the given context and for which the
individual's social aﬃliation is high.
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Benjamin et al. (2010), using experimental evidence and building on a
model inspired by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), examine how religious identity
inﬂuence individuals' choices, and ﬁnd that the saliency of religious identity
stimulates individual contributions to public goods and other expectations
on such contributions, Catholicism reduces risk aversion. However, they
ﬁnd that religious identity does not aﬀect work eﬀort, discount rates and
generosity in a dictator game.
Bénabou and Tirole (2007) model a broad class of beliefs of individuals
including their identity, which people value and invest in. They also study
endogenously arising self-serving beliefs linked to pride, dignity or wishful
thinking. Norms about ﬁtting in diﬀer across time and space (Akerlof and
Kranton 2005). In regards to modelling identity and work incentives, Akerlof
and Kranton (2005) envisage corporate culture as the division of the workers
into diﬀerent groups, the prescribed behaviour for each group and the ex-
tent to which workers identify with the organization or with the workgroup
and adopt their respective goals. The Battu et al. (2007) model  where
non-Whites identify with their social environment, their culture of origin,
and where social networks can ﬁnd them jobs  they ﬁnd that individuals,
who are otherwise identical, end up with totally diﬀerent choices. Depending
on how strong peer pressures are, non-Whites choose to adopt `oppositional'
identities because some individuals may identify with the dominant culture
and others may reject it, even if it implies adverse labour market outcomes.
In another empirical study, Battu and Zenou (2010) investigate the relation-
ship between ethnic identity and employment. They ﬁnd that in the UK, the
individuals' identity choice is very much inﬂuenced by their social environ-
ment, that there is considerable heterogeneity in the non-White population
in terms of preferences and that those non-whites who develop and mani-
fest oppositional and extreme identities are penalized in the labour market,
experiencing a 6% to 7% lower probability of being in employment.
Bisin et al. (2006) ﬁnd that, in line with their theoretical analysis, iden-
tity with and socialization to an ethnic minority are more pronounced in
mixed than in segregated neighborhoods. The strength of identiﬁcation with
the majority culture regardless of the strength of (ethnic) minority identity is
important for labour market outcomes (Nekby and Rödin 2010). Reviewing
the relevant literature outside economics, we ﬁnd that among the suggested
and widely used key elements of ethnic identity are the subjective expression
of one's commitment to, sense of belonging to, or self-identiﬁcation with the
culture, values and beliefs of a speciﬁc ethnic group and social life (Masuda
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et al. 1970, Makabe 1979, Unger et al. 2002). Most frequently employed
are cultural elements such as language, religion, media and food preferences,
celebrated holidays and behaviour (Phinney 1990, 1992, Unger et al. 2002).
Bellini et al. (2009) conﬁrm that diversity is positively correlated with pro-
ductivity. Constant et al. (2009) conjecture that an immigrant moves along
a plane formed by two positive vectors normalized from 0 to 1, with 1 repre-
senting maximum commitment. The horizontal axis measures commitment
to and self-identiﬁcation with the country of origin, and the vertical axis
measures commitment to and self-identiﬁcation with the host country. Con-
stant and Zimmermann (2008) ﬁnd that the ethnic identity of immigrants is
a strong determinant of their labour force participation.
2.3 Pure and instrumental eﬀects
Identity might interact with issues such as interest on certain information
sources. The higher a group in the status hierarchy, the more this group
can contribute to the positive social identity of its members. Accordingly, it
is possible to distinguish from Akerlof and Kranton (2000) that pure mem-
bership eﬀects form other instrumental reasons for using social identity to
ascend socially, obtain additional income and generally self interest. Pure
identity eﬀects refers to the desire and utility gain that results from acting in
compliance with one's own identity, which refers to internalised social rules
and personality.
Instrumental identity lies in the assumption that individuals invest in dif-
ferent identity aﬃliations (Becker and Mulligan 1997, Fang and Loury 2005,
Bénabou and Tirole 2007). Hence, identity can turn out to be a strategic
action to maximize utility and payoﬀs.
2.4 Other related concepts
It is argued that social capital is determined by culture and institutions.
For instance, institutions in place such as the welfare state might inﬂuence
preferences for redistribution, but enduring social values underpin such in-
stitutions in the creation of capital. However social identity is embodied in
individuals so that social capital contains social norms and culturally induced
preferences.
A variable that parallels identity is proximity. Indeed, proximity reﬂects
some idea of social distance, which indeed, reﬂects the extent to which lan-
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guage and codes of communication compare across individuals. This is con-
sistent with the ﬁnding that members of a speciﬁc group trust each other in
ways non-members do not and communication among members takes place
incurring in smaller transaction costs (Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo 2009).
Identity might be simply a measure of social distance, in that those with
whom people identify are simply those to whom people feel closest and whose
needs are perceived to be closest to their own. Hence, besides simple cate-
gorisations, the strength of identity is possibly a factor that matters but it
is diﬃcult to measure in natural groups and instead tends to be elicited in
induced group identities. However, inevitably when identity is induced in an
experiment it is hard to know the extent to which group identity is based on
the right social categorisation.
2.5 Modelling Identity
Seminal model (Akerlof and Kranton 2000)
Identity is based on social categories C, each person j has these categories.
Prescriptions P indicate social norms of each social category or an ideal for
each category. An individual's utility function is as follows:
Uj = Uj (aj, aj, Ij) ,
where Ij is the identity of person j, aj the actions of j and aj the actions of
others. Identity can be modelled as:
Ij = Ij (aj, aj, cj, P ) ,
where P refers to prescriptions, and cj refers to social categories.
Identity as a priming social norm (Benjamin et al. 2010)
An individual belongs to a social category, such as a language, religious or
social group with a strength s ≥ 0 which has a weight of w(s) in the utility
function. Let x denote some action that the individual may decide to take:
let the individual's preferred action in the absence of identity considerations
be x0 and let the action prescribed by identity be xc; the individual's utility
can be expressed as:
U = − [1− w (s)] [x− x0]2 − w (s) [x− xc]2 ,
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where the weight of a zero-strength category is nil, and the disutility of
deviating from one's norm decreases with s. The individual chooses x to
maximise utility for a given value of s; so the ﬁrst-order condition gives the
optimal decision as:
x∗ = [1− w (s)]x0 + w (s)xc,
a weighted average of the preferred action with and without identity. The
priming eﬀect can be deﬁned as follows:
dx∗
ds
= w′ (s) [xc − x0] ,
which indicates that evoking an individuals identity s in an experiment will
trigger preference assimilation only for those highly identiﬁed with that iden-
tity, namely those whose actions are not too distant from those prescribed
by a speciﬁc social category.
Identity as Status (Klor and Shayo 2010)
Shayo (2009) conceptualises identity as status (Sj) as follows: identiﬁcation
with a group means caring about the status of the group. So, consider a
a number of groups labelled 1, 2, ..., J and let us suppose that everyone in
some group j uses another group r(j) as a point of reference. Actions a of
the individuals and their payoﬀs are represented by the status of a group
deﬁned as a function of the group's payoﬀs as follows:
Sj = Sj
(
pij (a) , pir(j) (a)
)
and the utility function is given by
Uj = u (pij (a)) + v
(
pi
r(j) (a)
)
where u and v are both strictly increasing functions and u is weakly concave
Oppositional identities (Bisin et al. 2011)
Battu et al. (2007) and Battu and Zenou (2010) contribute to the concep-
tualisation of identity by deﬁning an individual's utility function as a set of
actions based on binary events (for example, wear the veil, G, or do not wear
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the veil, B) and the intensity of its identity , so that individuals maximise
the following welfare expression:
W (x, α) = u(x, α)=λ(α)QI=C(α)
for x = G, B where the term λ(α)QI refers to the social utility loss for
individual of interacting with individuals of diﬀerent groups, Ii and Qi are,
respectively, the psychological cost and the probability of an interaction, and
C(α) is the direct cost of an interaction.
Based on the four diﬀerent models of identity we can conclude that all
consider identity a component to be added in the individual utility func-
tion, either directly (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) or indirectly through status
(Shayo 2009). Hence, identity qualiﬁes as a category that, when made salient,
inﬂuences behaviour..
2.6 Measuring identity
Identity can be measured through several questions that contrast diﬀerent
types of identity, including territory (more European than Italian), gender
(being female matters), ethnicity and the like. For instance, Manning and
Roy (2007) adopt a measure of integration constructed from answers to the
question: What do you consider your national identity to be? Please choose
as many or as few as apply. This is similar to Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008).
Other studies build up synthetic indexes from questions regarding the im-
portance of religion, attitude towards inter-marriage, and the importance of
racial composition in schools.
Chen and Li (2009) formulate group identity based on a set of sequential
allocation games experiments on students. Benjamin et al. (2010) focus
on priming religious concept to strength religious aﬃliation on students and
participation on behavioural games.
3 Reinterpreting Empirical Evidence
The economics literature has long been interested in exploring evidence on in-
equality and redistribution. Preferences for redistribution depend on current
and future economic position.
Frey and Meier (2004) ﬁnd that student donations to university funds are
lower at the very beginning and at the very end of the respective student's
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time at the university. In other words, precisely when students are more
identiﬁed with the group, the more they are more willing to donate.
Income determines support for redistribution, as well as marital status,
employment status, education and age, race has a very strong eﬀect: blacks
are much more favourable to redistribution than whites (Alesina and Giu-
liano 2010). Women are more pro-redistribution then men, even though the
eﬀect of gender is much smaller than that of race. More educated individ-
uals are more averse to redistribution. More left-wing individuals are more
pro-redistribution even after controlling for income, which already points in
the direction of models highlighted above where an ideological dimension
matters. Protestants appear to be less favourable to redistribution.
The literature on the determinants of redistributional preferences has
grown rapidly. First, as elaborated in the following, this article's theoreti-
cal framework relies on the premise that it is mainly economic self-interest
that shapes pro-redistribution preferences. This premise also underlies the
economic literature on social upward mobility (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005,
Bénabou and Ok 2001, Piketty 1995) as well as class-based explanations of
redistributional preferences,mainly found in sociology (Svallfors 2004). The
second approach posits that not only an individual's income but also his or
her values and beliefs prescribe preferences toward redistribution. Beliefs
about the causes of inequality, considerations of fairness, religious beliefs,
hope for reciprocity, and altruism have been suggested as the driving forces
behind the formation of attitudes toward redistribution (Alesina and Angele-
tos 2005, Bénabou and Tirole 2006, Fong 2001, Scheve and Stasavage 2006,).
The third approach centers around the idea that an individual's preferences
for redistribution depend upon its eﬀect on the relative living standard of the
individual (Corneo and Grüner 2002, pp. 86-87). People hold interpersonal
preferences, namely, preferences that depend on the characteristics of oth-
ers. Group loyalty (Luttmer 2001), diﬀerences in status (Corneo and Grüner
2000), and race or ethnicity (Alesina and Glaeser 2004) have also been sug-
gested as determinants of pro-redistribution preferences (Meltzer and Richard
1981). In this model, a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt paid through proportional taxes im-
plies that individuals with incomes higher than the mean income will oppose
redistributive spending. Individuals with incomes below the mean, on the
other hand, will be in favor of redistributive spending up to the point where
the beneﬁt for them is outweighed by the eﬃciency costs of taxation. Em-
pirically, this implies a negative relationship between income and support
for redistribution. Finally, redistribution will also be demanded as insurance
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against risks that are to insure privately (Moene and Wallerstein 2001).
4 Evidence
4.1 Social and Group Identity
Evidence from the literature in psychology (Pettigrew 1998) and the eco-
nomics literature (Gang et al. 2002) suggest that there is a general tendency
towards in-group preference because people are more inclined to concede
rights and entitlements to their own group or to persons who are perceived
as the same than to those regarded as diﬀerent. Gang et al. (2002) ﬁnd ev-
idence of group eﬀects on a prisoner's dilemma experiment using data from
natural groups in the Swiss Army. However, when experimental data is ex-
amined then results are more mixed. Eckel and Grossman (2005) show that
group identity is insuﬃcient to enhance public good cooperation, though ac-
tions enhancing group behaviour do have a positive eﬀect on cooperation.
In contracts, Charness et al. (2007) ﬁnd that using standard social iden-
tity measures, no signiﬁcant eﬀects are found in a battle of sexes game and
McLeish and Oxoby (2007) ﬁnd that negative outgroup opinion might enforce
cooperation. Finally (Chen and Li 2009) ﬁnd evidence that group identity
has signiﬁcant eﬀects on distribution preferences. Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo
(2009) distinguish the eﬀect of identity resulting from simple belonging to
a group from other idiosyncratic inﬂuences such as social norms and other
group characteristics, and undertake a valuation of group membership using
incentive compatible willingness to pay and to accept. Yet the importance of
the latter lies in that in small and artiﬁcial groups evidence is found on social
identity eﬀects (Chen and Li 2009). Group identity enhances rewards and
reduces punishments, disproves distribution preferences and social welfare
maximising actions. Klor and Shayo (2010) ﬁnd that over a third deviate
from self interest and back group tax rate, however individuals responses to
group-individual interest trade oﬀs were aﬀected by self interest.
4.2 National Identity and social class identiﬁcation
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) show that preferences and attitudes to-
wards the state diﬀerent between eastern and western Germany as reﬂect-
ing endurance and communist values. However, using contingent valuation
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techniques for the world cup as a case study, Süssmuth et al. (2009) ﬁnd
that the eﬀects are less lasting. Burlando and Hey (1997) ﬁnd that in a
public good experiment context, Italians are more likely to contribute than
English. Other evidence that is consistent with the importance of national
attachments is empirical evidence showing that attitudes towards migration
reﬂect nationalist sentiments (O'Rourke and Sinnot 2006).
In dealing with national identity, it becomes essential to distinguish its
cultural and legal dimensions. Whilst the latter is reﬂected into diﬀerences
in attachments and objective factors deﬁning a culture, the former relies on
a related concept of citizenship which in some dimensions overalls with that
of identity.
Class identiﬁcation is found to predict voting behaviour (Evans 2000).
Empirical evidence from (Shayo (2009, 2010) suggests that indeed status does
exert an inﬂuence in explaining identity related behaviour. Poorer individuals
are more likely to be nationalistic (Shayo 2009), which is explained by a
higher similarity to the national prototype.
Furthermore, the formation of a group requires the existence of an outer
group and this is especially the case of national identity in such a way that
the absence an outer group can be argued to inhibit the formation of global
politics when committing to global agreements is costly (Wichardt 2008).
Casey and Dustmann (2010) also examine ethnic identity in Germany. Their
ﬁndings suggest that children of immigrants identify more strongly with their
home country than with the host country. Both mothers and fathers have
a very weak sense of German identity and identify quite strongly with their
native country. They also ﬁnd that the time spent in Germany increases
the probability of reporting a German identity. Nekby and Rödin (2010).
analyze the question of ethnic identity in Sweden. Their results indicate
that the feeling of togetherness with the Swedish majority culture is not
systematically connected to the probability of feeling a strong connection
with the minority culture.
4.3 Gender and Language
The importance of language is gathered in diﬀerent studies. Cadsby and
Maynes (1998) examine whether gender identity inﬂuences voluntary con-
tributions to public goods and ﬁnd that genders does not exert signiﬁcant
eﬀects. However, in a threshold public goods experiment. Croson et al.
(2003) ﬁnd that gender identity is signiﬁcant in a naturally occurring group.
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Solow and Kirkwood (2002) ﬁnd evidence of gender group behaviour on pub-
lic good contributions. Benjamin et al. (2010) ﬁnd that in two laboratory
experiments making gender identity more salient induces some conformity
with gender induced norms.
Consistently with the idea that communication between members of a
group leads to lower transaction costs, a common language is expected to
help to enhance a sense of belonging as it has been shown in the case of Cat-
alonia and the Basque Country (Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008). Language can
be an important marker of social identity by aﬀecting individuals interdepen-
dence, and individuals' might seek social mobility by being evaluate in using
language in a more evaluated group. Language is explored as determinant
of cultural identity and as explaining economic exchange in Germany (Falk
et al. 2010). The importance of language is picked up in the association
between, ethnolinguistic diversity and redistribution, the provision of public
goods (Desmet et al. 2009).
4.4 Ethnicity and Migration
Migration changes the social composition of the welfare state clientele; un-
der the conditions of greater social heterogeneity it becomes more diﬃcult to
gain the endorsement of the welfare state. Bay and Pedersen (2006) demon-
strate how support for speciﬁc social welfare beneﬁts greatly depends on the
composition of the group receiving welfare. Greif (1994) shows that ethnic
networks adopting a common set for institutional rules reduce the cost of co-
ordination and enforcement. Darity et al. (2006) use an evolutionary game
to explain the formation of racial identity being the result of both intra- and
inter-group interactions. Keely and Tan (2008) ﬁnd that general views on
redistribution are heterogeneous according to race as well as income determi-
nants including socioeconomic background, age, and gender. Speciﬁc views
on welfare are heterogeneous primarily according to race.
Similarly, studies examining racial identity argue that individuals tend
to assume the identity of the dominant group. Bodenhorn and Ruebeck
(2003) ﬁnd that mixed-race people beneﬁted when they could form a distinct
racial class between dominant white and subordinate black: they endogenise
racial identity and make it contextual. Drawing from a Becker-like model,
Stewart (1997) provides the initial attempt to formalize an economic anal-
ysis of identity. He argues that the intensity of racialcultural identity of
individual of group is a commodity that should be included in the individ-
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ual's utility function. Individual racialcultural identity as a direct argu-
ment of individual utility is aﬀected by the prevailing norms of own- and
other-group racialcultural identity. Intertemporal change in the stock of
own-group racialcultural identity is a complex composite of individuals' de-
mands for identity. Bernhard et al. (2006) ﬁnd that in the context of native
population in Papua New Guinea, there was evidence of intra-group altruism.
Furthermore Darity et al. (2006) draw upon an evolutionary game model of
the formation of racial identity. The construction of racial identity is the
result of both intra- and inter-group interactions. Their ﬁndings indicate one
type of equilibrium labelled as an individualist social norm, where all persons
pursue an individualist identity strategy; thus race is insigniﬁcant for both
market and non-market social interactions. A second type of equilibrium is
a racialist social norm, where all persons pursue a racialist identity strat-
egy: race is signiﬁcant for both market and non-market social interactions.
Fryer and Torelli (2005) ﬁnd that acting white behavioural norms among
blacks in the US (i.e., associating academic success to lack of identity) are
more developed in racially mixed schools, and inﬂuence behaviour of certain
minorities.
Attitudes towards the welfare state might be aﬀected in the same way
as attitudes towards migration by whether individuals are skilled workers or
not, given that the welfare state aﬀects individuals' wages of those better
oﬀ, as well as skilled workers. Yet traditional economic models argue that
attitudes towards an institution that carried out redistribution (redistributive
institution) are determined by the net gain individuals receive. On the other
hand, social values might shift this relationship, as welfare state attitudes
reﬂect cultural preferences, which include locally formed values and memories
of the past where individuals derive utility from attaining a better match
between their identity and their actions.
4.5 Religion
Alesina and Giuliano (2009) ﬁnd that certain religious aﬃliations are asso-
ciated with a higher preference for redistribution. Furthermore, Guiso et al.
(2003) ﬁnd that religion matters as a driver of economic attitudes. Bisin et al.
(2004) show that religious socialization across US states is more intense when
a religion is in a minority. Furthermore, Bisin et al. (2008) examine religious
identity in the UK. Using the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities
(FNSEM), they carry on an empirical analysis of religious identity, to explore
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quantitative and qualitative diﬀerences in the process of cultural integration
between Muslims and other UK minorities. Their ﬁndings indicate, that
Muslims having an intense religious identity is roughly twice as large as that
of non-Muslims. For Muslims, the number of years since arrival does not
seem to be related to their inclination to assimilate. In terms of estimated
probability of having a strong religious identity, a Muslim born in the UK and
having spent there more than 30 years is comparable with a non-Muslim just
arrived in the country. Similarly, Constant et al. (2006) adopt a deﬁnition of
integration that accounts for several cultural and religious factors, including
social interactions, and ﬁnd signiﬁcantly diﬀerent integration patterns for
Muslims and Christians in Germany.
Manning and Roy (2007, 2010), using the UK Labour Force Survey in
2001, ﬁnd no evidence of a culture clash in general, and none connected with
Muslims in particular. More speciﬁcally, using this measure they report that
a large fraction of those individuals in the sample who are born in Britain
actually report a British national identity and that such fraction is larger for
third than for second-generation immigrants.
Benjamin et al. (2010) ﬁnds that religious identity aﬀects contributions
to public goods, Protestantism (Catholicism) increases (decreases) contribu-
tions, Judaism increases worker reciprocity.
4.6 Risk attitudes, time preferences and sorting
Benjamin et al. (2010) ﬁnd that when ethnic identity is made salient Asian-
Americans make more patient choices and blacks make more risk averse
choices. Furthermore, Watson and McLanahan (2009) ﬁnd that relative in-
come of a local reference group determine marriage decisions.
4.7 Political participation
Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008) ﬁnd using data from Arab communities that
voters are more likely to vote for a candidate that shares their social group
identity. Individuals not only cared about themselves in voting, but on the
beneﬁts of their hamula (an Arab community organisation).
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5 Discussion
The recognition of the relevance of social identity implies the recognition
that the social environment and culture matters, and raises the classic issue
of preference endogeneity. Identity is argued to inﬂuence how people behave,
which in turn aﬀects individual social environment and in turn aﬀects identity
and behaviour again. The reﬂection problem has been extensively discussed
by Manski (2000) as a limitation to identify social interactions and peer
eﬀects.
Another form of endogeneity lies in the inﬂuence of institutions, which can
be separated from culture or the social environment individuals are subject
to. However, culture and institutions might well reinforce each other, and
empirical analysis is challenged by the need of disentangling one from the
other.
At an institutional level, the welfare state was made out of a process of in-
tegration of national states, but at the same time it contributed to deepening
and strengthening of the bonds between its members, so that the relationship
between identity and redistribution is likely to be recursive. Indeed, diﬀerent
cultures may emphasize in diﬀerent ways the relative merits of equality ver-
sus individualism, an issue discussed in detail by Alesina and Glaeser (2004),
therefore some forms of circularity exists between individual and societal at-
titudes to inequality and preferences for redistribution. Methodologies to
measure identity are varied. Two studies have explored the issue of social
identity and pro-social behaviour using controlled experiments. Chen and
Li (2009) have examined directly the question of group identity and social
preferences using experimental evidence. Furthermore, Hargreaves Heap and
Zizzo (2009) again using experimental evidence found that group member-
ship reduce charitable giving to outsiders and that individuals value own
group membership. Another type of evidence is that of econometric studies.
Alesina and Giuliano (2010) examine individual's evidence for redistribution
preferences using the General Social Survey and the World Values Survey
and ﬁnd that historical experiences and culture are key features.
There is robust evidence that individual self-interest fails to explain social
behaviour, and this needs to be balanced out with group self interest. Ev-
idence across the board suggests that group identiﬁcation and that diﬀerent
categorisations are important. One important question in modelling identity
lies in separating those components of identity that are endogenous because
they result from people's choices and those that are given. Individuals are
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not entirely free to choose their own identity given that it may be imposed
on them in light of others' behaviours and perceptions.
One of the conclusions of the identity literature are that member's inter-
actions within the group make interaction with non-members less desirable.
Namely, evidence suggests that stronger identiﬁcation with a group will in-
crease cooperation with this group relative to others. However, evidence from
artiﬁcial and natural groups exhibits diﬀerent results.
Preference interdependence might results from the existence of forms of
social identiﬁcation with some reference groups, in the form of so called
reference dependent preferences (Loomes et al. 2003). Another possible
behavioural explanation of the importance of identity in the formation of
individuals' preferences is the existence of conﬁrmatory bias, which implies
that once an individual forms a strong hypothesis about something they tend
to be inattentive to new information (Rabin 1998). Some other explanations
of these eﬀects lie in the neuro-economics literature where it is found that
neuro-transmitters and levels of serotonin are linked to interdependent pref-
erences (Zizzo 2002).
Traditionally social identity is a category that lies very much outside
the realm of economics, and has been explored by social psychology and
sociological literatures. On policy grounds, stigma in dealing with social
identity lie possibly in the assumption of a concept of equality that equals
uniformity, and that any recognition of prevalence value for an individual or
a society of a speciﬁc identity is a form of exclusion, xenophobia and when
racism individualised. Yet, this feature opens up the debate on the economics
of culture as nurturing social choice.
Among the most important questions that still need further examination,
there remain: tying up social identity with other related approaches such as
club goods. Similarly, some studies associate identity as a form of status and
as a stream of the literature on esteem. Finally, at the moment most studies
employ a partial measure of social identity based on some categorisation, but
still research needs to identify which dimensions of identity are more relevant
beyond nationality, race and ethnicity.
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